Dissatisfied, Pétain journeyed on to Herr’s headquarters to assess the situation himself and found a scene of desolation: A crestfallen Herr told him that Fort Douaumont, bulwark of the French defenses at Verdun, had fallen earlier that day.
Though de Castelnau had reconnoitered the battlefield, he could provide Pétain with only sketchy progress reports. Joffre’s deputy, General Nöel de Castelnau, greeted Pétain. On February 25 he traveled there by car through a foul winter storm. Pétain had chosen the town of Souilly, about 9 miles south of Verdun, as the headquarters of the Second Army. In the bloody battles of 1914–15 he achieved numerous victories, notably at the Marne and Champagne, and became known as one of the French army’s best generals. His long-advocated doctrine of firepower proved correct on the battlefield, and he made a dizzying ascent from brigade commander to commanding general of the French Second Army in less than six months. Then came the Great War, and Pétain went from heretic to prophet.
Pétain’s unfashionable theories and bluntness resulted in his being denied general officer rank, so in 1914 he was a lieutenant colonel, just one year short of mandatory retirement. Scoffing at such notions, Pétain insisted that firepower, generated by closely coordinated infantry and artillery, was the key to modern warfare. In the late 19th century, the French army had become enamored with the cult of the offensive and its doctrine that élan and the bayonet would carry the day. Cyr, and for the next 37 years he served with elite Chasseur Alpin (mountain infantry) regiments and taught at the French army’s infantry school, as well as the École Militaire (War College) in Paris. In 1877 Pétain graduated from the prestigious French military academy at St. He decided on a military career at age 14 after witnessing the destruction of his nation by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. Henri-Philippe Benoni Omer Pétain was born in 1856. Joffre told him help was on the way and then ordered Pétain’s Second Army into the battle. Joffre was not pleased when he learned of the move and ordered Herr to hold his ground and make no further withdrawals. General Frédéric Herr, commanding general of the RFV, knew his command was hopelessly overmatched and ordered a tactical withdrawal to concentrate his troops along the high ground east of the Meuse. After a 36-hour deluge of steel and poison gas, the German Fifth Army, commanded by the Kaiser’s eldest son, Crown Prince Wilhelm, surged to the attack. 21, 1916, when more than 3,500 German guns, the largest concentration of artillery yet seen in war, opened fire on the thinly held French lines in the Verdun salient. Where better, then, to draw the French army into a battle of attrition? Falkenhayn dubbed his plan Operation Gericht (“Place of Judgment”) and intended it to be the decisive battle that would destroy France and lead to ultimate German victory. General Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the German General Staff, knew the value of Verdun to France in terms of its defensive works, as well as its image as an impregnable fortress. Pétain then returned to his lover and enjoyed the remainder of what he later fondly recalled as a “memorable evening.” Unflappable as always, Pétain thanked Serrigny for his efforts, then instructed his flustered aide to obtain a room and get some rest, as they would leave in a few hours. Pétain knew that a German offensive had begun at Verdun a few days earlier, and he took the summons to mean that things were going badly and that he would soon enter the battle.
Serrigny apologized profusely to Pétain for intruding on his leave, then presented orders from General Joseph Joffre, commander in chief of the French army, directing Pétain to report to supreme headquarters at 8 that morning. Behind him, a woman discreetly covered herself with a blanket. Serrigny pounded on the door until a tall, powerfully built balding man with a large blonde moustache appeared.
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